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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A jury convicted appellant Clinton Duffus of certain drug- 
related offenses including conspiracy to distribute cocaine 
and cocaine base, RICO, possession of cocaine with intent 
to distribute, and money laundering. The district court on 
November 26, 1991, sentenced Duffus to concurrent 
sentences so that his effective custodial term was 400 
months. Duffus appealed but we affirmed on October 29, 
1992, by judgment order. See United States v. Duffus, 980 
F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1992) (table). Duffus did notfile a petition 
for certiorari. 
 
In March 1997, Duffus, who was pro se throughout the 
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 in the district court 
involved in this appeal, filed a motion seeking an extension 
of time to file a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct 
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sentence pursuant to section 2255.1 While the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA") provides "[a] 1-year period of limitation to a 
motion under" section 2255 measured from the latest of 
several events, the Department of Justice has taken the 
position that prisoners were entitled to a grace period after 
AEDPA's effective date of April 24, 1996, to file section 2255 
motions. Furthermore, we have held that federal prisoners 
were entitled to a full one-year period after April 24, 1996, 
to file section 2255 motions so that the AEDPA would not 
be "impermissibly retroactive." See Burns v. Morton, 134 
F.3d 109, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1998). Without that grace period, 
if Duffus had filed a motion for relief under section 2255 in 
March 1997, it would have been untimely as it is clear that 
in his case the one year would have been measured from 
the date when we affirmed his conviction on direct appeal 
and the period for seeking a writ of certiorari expired. See 
Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 577 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Thus, the effect of Burns v. Morton was to make Duffus's 
conviction and all other convictions in this circuit otherwise 
final before the effective date of the AEDPA, April 24, 1996, 
final on that day for purposes of calculating the limitations 
period under section 2255. 
 
The district court, by order dated April 18, 1997, denied 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 2255 provides in relevant part: 
 
       A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this 
       section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of -- 
 
        (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; 
 
        (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created 
       by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 
the 
       United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making 
       a motion by such governmental action; 
 
        (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized 
by 
       the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the 
       Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on 
       collateral review; or 
 
        (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims 
       presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 
       diligence. 
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Duffus's motion for an extension of time to file a motion for 
relief under section 2255, as it did not have the authority 
to extend the AEDPA statute of limitations. Nevertheless, 
the court indicated that Duffus could file his section 2255 
motion "and request leave to supplement it within 30 or 60 
days." 
 
On April 23, 1997, Duffus filed a timely section 2255 
motion within the grace period established by Burns v. 
Morton. In his motion Duffus asserted that his attorney had 
been ineffective because the attorney failed to contend on 
appeal that the evidence was insufficient to convict Duffus 
of money laundering and because the attorney failed to 
object at sentencing to the district court's use of the 
sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of the sentencing 
rather than those in effect in April 1988, when Duffus 
allegedly withdrew from the conspiracy. Duffus also 
asserted that the district court wrongfully attributed more 
than 50 kilograms of cocaine to him in calculating his 
sentence. The government filed a response urging that the 
"motion should be denied in its entirety" on the grounds 
that it was procedurally defective and lacking in merit.2 
 
Thereafter on October 28, 1997, more than six months 
after Duffus filed his section 2255 motion andfive years 
after we affirmed his conviction on his direct appeal, Duffus 
moved to amend the motion. His proposed amendment 
included various bases for relief and, as germane here, 
urged that his trial attorney had been ineffective for failing 
to move to suppress evidence. Duffus explained in his brief 
supporting his motion to amend that when the Philadelphia 
police stopped him on December 31, 1987, while he was 
driving a motor vehicle, they said that they did so because 
he had run a stop sign. They also stated that he ran away 
and dropped a sock containing nine ounces of cocaine 
which they recovered. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The government also contended that the petition was late because it 
was docketed in the district court on April 29, 1997. The court, however, 
regarded it as timely because Duffus placed it in the prison mail box on 
April 23, 1997. See Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d at 112-13. The 
government does not challenge this decision on this appeal. 
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Duffus indicated that when he found out that he was 
being charged for an offense arising out of his possession of 
this cocaine he advised his attorney that the police had 
stopped him for no reason and then found the cocaine 
inside his vehicle. Nevertheless, his attorney did not move 
to suppress the cocaine as evidence and he did not even 
investigate Duffus's assertion. Duffus argued that if his 
attorney had moved to suppress the evidence there was a 
reasonable probability that in evaluating the credibility of 
the witnesses the court would have believed him and 
granted the motion to suppress. He asserted that 
supression of the evidence would have led to his acquittal 
on the charge of possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute. 
 
The court referred Duffus's section 2255 motion, 
including the motion to amend, to a magistrate judge who 
filed a report and recommendation on April 6, 1998, 
recommending that the district court deny both Duffus's 
original motion and his motion to amend without an 
evidentiary hearing. On May 19, 1998, the district court 
entered an order approving and adopting the report and 
recommendation and denying the section 2255 motion, and 
thus the motion to amend as well, without an evidentiary 
hearing. Duffus then moved for reconsideration but the 
district court denied that motion on July 7, 1998. 
 
Duffus then appealed from the July 7, 1998 order, and 
filed a motion asking the district court to issue a certificate 
of appealability.3 The district court denied the motion by 
order entered August 20, 1998. Duffus also filed a request 
for a certificate of appealability with this court which a 
motions panel granted on August 20, 1998, on three 
issues, the third being Duffus's allegation "that the district 
court erred in denying [his] motion to amend his section 
2255 motion."4 On August 28, 1998, the government filed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Inasmuch as Duffus filed his section 2255 motion after the effective 
date of the AEDPA he was required to seek a certificate of appealability 
even though he had been convicted before that date. See United States 
v. Skandier, 125 F.3d 178, 180 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
4. Inasmuch as the district court denied a certificate of appealability, 
Duffus's appeal could not go beyond those three issues. See United 
States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 474 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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a motion seeking reconsideration of the order granting the 
certificate of appealability which the motions panel referred 
to the merits panel. 
 
On this appeal, Duffus argues only that the magistrate 
judge and the district court abused their discretion when 
they respectively recommended that the amendment not be 
allowed and denied the motion to amend. This appeal, 
however, can be only from the district court's order. The 
particular argument that Duffus sought to make in his 
motion to amend, which he presses on this appeal, is that 
his attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to 
move to suppress the nine ounces of cocaine seized when 
the police arrested him on December 31, 1987.5 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
The magistrate judge recommended that the district court 
deny the motion to amend because he concluded that 
Duffus's delay in presenting the issues in the amendment 
was unwarranted. He pointed out that Duffus waited six 
years before he filed the section 2255 motion and that he 
had the advantage of the one-year grace period. Moreover, 
there was nothing in the motion to amend that could not 
have been included in the original motion. The magistrate 
judge also noted that the district court indicated that it 
would allow Duffus additional time, 30 or 60 days, to move 
to supplement his motion. Yet, Duffus filed the motion to 
amend well after the court's deadline. Finally, the 
magistrate judge said that the motion to amend sought to 
advance issues that had "no merit." The district court 
entered its order approving and adopting the report and 
recommendation and denying the motion to amend without 
opinion. 
 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to motions to 
amend habeas corpus motions. See Riley v. Taylor, 62 F.3d 
86, 89 (3d Cir. 1995). We review a district court order 
denying a motion to amend for an abuse of discretion. See 
id. Rule 15(a) provides that a party may amend his pleading 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The amendment raised other issues but Duffus does not advance 
them on this appeal. 
 
                                6 
  
once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive 
pleading is filed. In this case, however, the government filed 
a responsive pleading before Duffus sought to amend his 
motion and it opposed the amendment. Therefore, in issue 
here is the portion of Rule 15(a) providing that when 
amendment as a matter of course is not allowed, "a party 
may amend the party's pleadings only by leave of court 
[which] leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." 
 
The Supreme Court has indicated that in the absence of 
evidence of "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on 
the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies 
by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the 
opposing party by virtue of allowing the amendment [or] 
futility of amendment," leave to amend should be freely 
given. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 
230 (1962). Furthermore, we have indicated that ordinarily 
delay alone is not a basis to deny a motion to amend. See, 
e.g., Riley, 62 F.3d at 91; Cornell & Co., Inc. v. Occupational 
Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d 
Cir. 1978). Thus, at first glance it might be thought that 
Duffus makes a strong showing that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying leave to amend unless the 
amendment would have been futile. 
 
There is, however, a special situation here. Under the 
AEDPA statute of limitations, with its recognized grace 
period, Duffus had until April 23, 1997, to file his motion 
because 28 U.S.C. S 2255 provides that motions must be 
filed within one year from "the date on which the judgment 
of conviction becomes final." While section 2255 has three 
additional provisions providing for later dates from which 
the statute runs, none is implicated here. Thus, in the 
absence of the one-year grace period, the AEDPA would 
have barred Duffus's motion when the AEDPA became 
effective. As we have explained, however, because of the 
grace period, Duffus's conviction for purposes of the section 
2255 limitations period became final on April 24, 1996. 
Accordingly, if the district court had granted the motion to 
amend, filed on October 28, 1997, it would have frustrated 
the intent of Congress that claims under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 
be advanced within one year after a judgment of conviction 
becomes final unless any of the other circumstances in 28 
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U.S.C. S 2255 are applicable. Therefore, we cannot possibly 
say that the court abused its discretion when it denied the 
motion to amend. 
 
We do not go so far as to suggest that the district court 
could not have permitted any amendment of the motion 
after April 23, 1997. Certainly the court could have 
permitted an amendment to clarify a claim initially made.6 
Here, however, while Duffus asserted in his initial motion 
that his attorney had been ineffective, the particular claim 
with respect to failing to move to suppress evidence was 
completely new. Thus, the amendment could not be deemed 
timely under the "relation back" provisions of Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 15(c). As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
recently explained in United States v. Craycraft, 167 F.3d 
451, 457 (8th Cir. 1999), "If the ineffective conduct alleged 
by Craycraft in his first petition cannot be said to have 
arisen out of the same set of facts as his amended claim, 
his amendment cannot relate back and his claim must be 
time-barred since it was filed after the statutory period of 
limitation." We find Craycraft to be a compelling precedent. 
In these circumstances and considering the April 23, 1997 
deadline, the district court was correctly circumspect in 
considering an application to amend. Indeed, the court was 
generous, perhaps to a fault, in indicating that it would 
consider a request made by Duffus, within 30 or 60 days 
after he filed his original motion, to supplement the motion.7 
 
We reiterate that if the court permitted the amendment it 
would have acted contrary to the policy of the AEDPA, 
which requires courts to measure the running of the 
limitations periods from the date on which the judgment of 
conviction becomes final. While the statute will run from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In our discussion we are proceeding on the understanding that none 
of the statutory bases for extending the statute of limitations beyond one 
year after the judgment of conviction is applicable here. Obviously we are 
not concerned here with an amendment of a section 2255 motion to 
advance a claim that is timely under that section. 
 
7. Duffus cannot claim reasonably that the court misled him by 
indicating that it would entertain a motion to supplement the original 
motion as the court limited the period to file the motion to 30 or 60 days 
after Duffus filed his first motion, and Duffus took six months to seek to 
amend. 
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"the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims 
presented could have been discovered through the exercises 
of due diligence" if that date follows the date the judgment 
of conviction becomes final, Duffus was aware of the facts 
to support his claim before his conviction becamefinal. In 
these circumstances, an amendment to introduce the new 
theory into the case that his trial attorney had been 
ineffective for failing to move to suppress the cocaine, is 
simply not acceptable. 
 
In reaching our result we recognize that the law 
governing habeas corpus motions can be quite technical 
and that it may be difficult for even an attorney to grasp all 
of its nuances. Surely, then, a court could not expect a pro 
se litigant such as Duffus to understand all the aspects of 
those proceedings. Duffus, however, raised an issue that 
was not technical and that he identified before his trial 
even began. Moreover, he does not claim that he thought 
that his trial attorney in fact moved to suppress. Therefore, 
Duffus had every reason to include an argument that his 
attorney had been ineffective by failing to move to suppress 
evidence in his initial section 2255 motion. Accordingly, the 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to 
amend. See Parker v. Champion, 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th 
Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1053 (1999). 
 
We make one final point. We do not suggest that the 
government would have been prejudiced by Duffus's delay 
if the court granted his motion to amend. In fact, the 
magistrate judge recommended rejection on the merits of all 
of Duffus's contentions in his initial section 2255 motion, 
and clearly he similiarly would have recommended that the 
court reject the ineffective assistance of counsel argument 
if Duffus had included it in his initial motion. After all, the 
magistrate judge said the issues Duffus raised in the 
proposed amendment had "no merit." Furthermore, we 
cannot say that the passage of time, either from the 
conviction date until the time of the initial section 2255 
motion, or from the time of that motion until Duffus sought 
to amend, would have impaired the government's ability to 
prosecute this case if the district court had ordered a new 
trial. 
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We do not predicate our result, however, on a finding of 
prejudice. Instead, we have reached our conclusion in 
recognition of the principle that usually statutes of 
limitations operate without taking prejudice from delay into 
account. A prisoner should not be able to assert a claim 
otherwise barred by the statute of limitations merely 
because he asserted a separate claim within the limitations 
period. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the order of July 
7, 1998. 
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Teste: 
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